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SECURITIES LAW

FederalRegulation of Tender Offers:
Does It Depend Upon Nondisclosure?
by Carole B. Silver

Barbara R. Schreiber
V.

Burlington Northern, Inc.
(Docket No. 83-2129)
ArgnedJanuaty 9, 1985
ISSUE
The issue in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern is
whether conduct which is not deceptive may nevertheless violate the Williams Act-the federal law regulating
tender offers which is part of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act prohibits
any "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer." In this case,
the meaning of "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative"
is disputed. The Supreme Court is being asked to decide
whether deception or misrepresentation (i.e., the lack of
full disclosure) is a necessary element of any act that
comes within the section 14(e) prohibition, or, on the
other hand, whether an act may be fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative in the context of a tender offer even
though there has been full disclosure to all of' the interested parties.
FACTS
Burlington Northern, Inc. is a transportation and
natural resources company. On December 21, 1982, it
made a tender offer for 25.1 million shares of comnmon
stock of El Paso Company, an energy company, at an
offering price of' $24 per share. By this offer, Burlington Northern hoped to acquire control of El Paso.
El Paso's management initially opposed Burlington
Northern's tender offer on the grounds that $2,4 per
share was an inadequate price for El Paso. In fact, El
Paso's management took several steps to try to defeat the
tender offer-including advising its shareholders not to
tender their shares and filing a lawsuit to enjoin the
offer. In spite of these efforts, by December 30, 1982,
25.1 million shares of El Paso common stock had been
tendered to Burlington Northern.
At that point, the management of El Paso relented
and initiated negotiations with Burlington Northern.
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These negotiations resulted in an agreement for Buirlington Northern to acquire El Paso on slightly different
terms than the December 21 tender offer. Burlington
Northern withdrew the December 21 tender offer and
released the tendered shares. The offer had not rtun to
the established expiration date (January 19, 1983) and,
as a result, Burlington Northern had not then puchased the tendered shares. The December 21 offer
stated that it could be withdrawn should certain conditions occur. At least some of these conditions had taken
place, and Burlington Northern justified withdrawing
the December 21 offer on the basis of these events. After
withdrawal of the initial tender offer. Burlington Northern announced its intention to immediately make a new
tender offer for 21 million shares of El Paso common
stock, at the same price of $24 per share. The revised
tender offer was for 4.1 million fewer shares than the
initial offer since El Paso had agreed to sell some stock
directly to Burlington Northern and also granted Builigton Northern an option for additional shares. The
price of the stock to be acquired f'rom El Paso and the
option price were also $2,1 per share. This arrangement
was beneficial to Burlington Northern when compared
to the original offer, since the money paid to El Paso for
the stock would ultimately accrue to the benefit of Burlington Northern when the acquisition was completed.
The revised tender offer also benefited the management of El Paso because they could tender their El Paso
shares, which they had not tendered in the initial offer.
The revised tender offer was oversubscribed, so Burlington Northern purchased a pro rata portion of' the
shares tendered by each shareholder including that of El
Paso management. The revised offer was successful and
Burlington Northern acquired control of El Paso. Subsequently, Burlington Northern acquired all of the remaining outstanding shares of El Paso for the tender
offer price of $2, per share.
Barbara Schreiber was a shareholder in El Paso when
Burlington Northern made its tender offers. She
brought suit on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated El Paso shareholders who had tendered in the
initial tender offer, claiming, among other things, that
the withdrawal of the December 21 offer by Burlington
Northern was a violation of section 14(e), as a nmanipulative act or practice in connection with a tender offer.
Schreiber claimed that she was injured by the withdrawal of the December 21 offer and the making of the
revised offer because she could not sell as many shares
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in the revised olfer as she could have sold in tile original
tender offer. Her claim is based on two differences
between the first and second tender offers: the lower
number of' shares sought by Burlington Northern in tile
revised offer and the flict that the revised offer was
oversubscribed. In tile initial tender offer, more of Schreiber's shares would have been purchased because Burlington Northern sought to acquire a greater total
number of' shares and management of El Paso was not
among the group of' initially tendering shareholders, so
fewer shares were tendered.
The District Court for the District of Delaware rejected Schreiber's claim. It ruled that a "manipulative"
act requires an act or practice that artificially affects the
market price in a misleading manner. The court found
that withdrawing the initial tender offer did not affect
the market price of El Paso stock in any manner that was
not fully disclosed to the shareholders. Because there
had been full disclosure, the court Found that there had
been no violation of the Williams Act.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals al'firmed (73 1
F.2d 163 (1984)), agreeing with the district court that
some element of deception is necessary to make out a
claim that the withdrawal of' tie tender offer by Burlington Northern constituted a manipulative act or practice.
Tile United States Supreme Court granted Schreiber's petition for a writ of' certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The issue involved here has caused a split in the
circuits, and that is undoubtedly one reason why tile
Supreme Court agreed to hear this case. The Sixth
Circuit has held that deception is not always required in
a case alleging manipulation in connection with a tender
offer under section 14(e); the other circuits that have
considered tile issue have denied recovery absent a
showing of' deception.
The real significance of this case, however, is much
broader than a conflict between tile circuits. In the late
1970s, the Supreme Court considered substantially the
same issue in the context of section 10(b) and Rule IOb5, the general antif'raud provisions of the federal securities laws. In Santa Fe Industries v. Green ('130 U.S. ,462
(1977)), the Court considered whether a breach of fiduciary duty that induced a sale of'securities was actionable
where the breach of' duty had been fily disclosed to the
sellers, and held that deception was a necessary element
in a 10b-5 claim. The Court interpreted the word "manipulation," as used in 10b-5, to require misrepresentation
or deceit. The Santa Fe decision was consistent with the
Court's unarticulated goal of limiting the availability of a
federal forum under the federal securities laws and
relegating complaints of substantive fairness in securities transactions to state law.

It would be consistent with the Santa Fe decision and
tile trend of restricting the scope of the fede'al securities

laws for the Court to uphold the Third Circuit's decision
in this case. Although there is some difference in the
language of sections 10(b) and 14(e) to support a distinction in the interpretation and scope of the two statutes,
the difference is irrelevant to Schreiber's claim. Section
14(e) prohibits "fraudulent" acts or practices in addition
to the nmanipulative or deceptive acts or practices pro.
hibited by section 10(b). This language distinction is not
of much help to Schreiber, who relies upon the term
"manipulation" to fit her claim within the ambit of section 14(e). "Manipulation" is the same term that the
Court interpreted in Santa Fe and other cases as requiring an element of deception. If the Court reversed the
Third Circuit, it would have to distinguish tender offers
From all other cases of securities transactions to justify a
definition of "manipulation" insection 1l4(e) that is different from the definition under section 10(b). Moreover, a body of federal law regarding the substantive
fairness of tender offers would need to be developed to
regulate the conduct that would then violate section
14(e).
Whatever decision the Supreme Court renders in
this case will be significant because of the ever-increasing use of tender offers as a method of acquiring
control of corporations. Tender offers have been characterized by the use of creative and somewhat questionable practices by all interested parties-the tender
offeror, the target company's nmanagement, and, many
times, a third party, intervenor. These tactics must be
capable of being challenged in some forrum, and tile
Court's decision inSchreiber will determine whether tile
federal courts will hear many of' these complaints. If the
Court decides that, absent nondisclosure, such practices
as engaged in by Burlington Northern must be challenged instate court, then either Congress will act to
require the federal courts to provide a forum for such
controversies by broadening tile statutory framework
for the regulation of tender offers or the matter will be
left to tile states to resolve.
ARGUMENTS
For Schreiber (Counsel of Record, Irving Bizar, 1370 Avenue of
the Americas, New York, NY 10019; telephone (212) 489-5222)
1. Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prohibits manipulative or fraudulent acts without a
showing of disclosure-and the withdrawal of the
initial tender offer by Burlington Northern constituted a manipulative act.
For Burlington Northern (Counsel of Record, Marc P.
Cherno, One New York Plaza, New York, NY 1000'; telephone (212) 820-8000)
1. Section 14(e) is not violated absent a showing of' nondisclosure, and Burlington Northern f'ully disclosed
its withdrawal of the initial tender offer and the terms
of its revised offer.
PREVIEW

